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COMMENT
PAROL MODIFICATION AND THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS: FITTING THE PIECES TOGETHER UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter "the Code" or
"UCC") was designed to provide uniformity and clarity to commer-
cial transactions. It has not been entirely successful in this
endeavor. Much has been criticized in the Code. Debate has
swirled around the provisions regarding modification of contracts
for the sale of goods. Section 2-209 of the Code addresses "Modifi-
cation, Rescission and Waiver."' For years, section 2-209 has left
judges, attorneys, and law students dumbfounded. Too often pre-
cedent has compelled both bench and bar to stretch equitable prin-
ciples to encompass the practical necessities of common
commercial practice.
The vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue of
whether all oral modifications of contracts within the statute of
1. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1998) provides:
§ 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a
signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be
separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section
2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other
party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the
retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on
the waiver.
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frauds must resatisfy the statute of frauds by a signed writing
have resolved that issue in the affirmative.2 If the original con-
tract satisfied the statute of frauds and the contract, as modified,
is within the statute, it is submitted that when read in light of
section 2-201, section 2-209(3) demands only that modifications of
the quantity term need to again satisfy the statute of frauds. Con-
versely, the language of the standard No Oral Modification
clause,' as addressed in section 2-209(2), requires that all modifi-
cations of a contract containing such a provision be documented by
a writing. This comment distinguishes the requirements of sec-
tions 2-209(2) and 2-209(3).
This comment explores, respectively, the history and purpose
of the statute of frauds, the requirement of the Code's statute of
frauds, the distinctions between sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(3),
the faults in the majority application of section 2-209(3), the pro-
posed application of section 2-209(3), and the benefits of the sub-
mitted application of section 2-209.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUiDs
The statute of frauds evolved in seventeenth century England
and was later carried over to the United States.4 Designed to
avoid fraud and perjury, the statute required that specified kinds
of contracts5 be written and signed or otherwise memorialized by
a note signed by the party to be charged or his authorized agent.6
2. Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir.
1978); Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Systems, Inc., 767 P.2d 740, 744 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991); Green Constr.
Co. v. First Indemnity of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D. N.J. 1990).
3. See 18 AM. JuR. 2D Legal Forms § 253:394 (1972).
4. See 6 WILLIAm HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 387-93
(Metheun & Co. Ltd. and Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1971) (2d ed. 1937); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1, at 391-96 (2d ed. 1990); Jason Scott Johnston,
The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1863-64 (1996); James J. O'Connell, Jr., Boats Against
the Current: The Courts and the Statute of Frauds, 47 EMORY L.J. 253, 257-58
(1998).
5. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 391; O'Connell, supra note 4, at
257-58. Such contracts were those to charge an executor or administrator to
answer out of his own estate for any special promise, for the conveyance of an
interest in real property, in consideration of marriage, unable to be performed
within one year, for the promise to answer for the debt or miscarriage of another
and for the sale of goods.
6. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4. See also Frank A. Rothermel, Role of Course
of Performance and Confirmatory Memoranda in Determining the Scope,
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Numerous courts and commentators have alluded to this purpose
in applying equitable principles to remove a contract from within
the statute.7 The written contract or memorandum served an evi-
dentiary function by supplying proof of the terms as well as a
deterrent function by discouraging actions on false allegations.'
The passing centuries brought new commercial practices and
dilemmas. The Code sought to redress some of these dilemmas by
loosening the requirements of the statute of frauds.9 Means of
Operation, and Effect of 'No Oral Modification' Clauses, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1239
(1987).
7. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1292
(7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrooke J., dissenting) (referring to "manufactured
assertions of alteration"); Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 190 (N.D.
1977). See Eisler, Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 TENN. L. REV. 401 (1990);
Rothermel, supra note 6. For an interesting discussion of wayward applications
of the statute of frauds, see O'Connell, supra note 4, at 268.
8. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 392. Eisler, supra note 7, at 415. See
also E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 LAW Q.
REV. 174, 175-178 (1947).
9. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1998) provides:
§ 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $ 500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term. agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents
is given within 10 days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy he requirements of subsection (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and
the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a
substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but
the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods
admitted; or
1999] 309
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satisfying the signature requirement broadened to encompass
commercial standards by, for example, allowing satisfaction of the
signature requirement by a preprinted letterhead"° or trade-
mark." The drafters went so far in accommodating business
practices that the merchant exception binds a merchant for his
inaction in failing to object within ten days to a memorandum that
would have previously bound only the sender.' 2
None of the Code's divergences from the original statute can
be said to be oversights. The Code is widely regarded as the most
thorough and comprehensive body of legislation in the history of
American jurisprudence. 13 In an attempt to provide uniformity,
the drafters and legislatures fitted the law to those most directly
affected by its provisions. 14 Catering to common commercial prac-
tices and seeking to standardize them, the drafters recognized the
frequency of oral modifications of contracts within the statute.' 5
Time constraints and the need for efficiency often overcome the
desire to reduce modifications to writing. Surely, the most desira-
ble situation allows time to prepare a document of modifications
and send it to the other party. Business, however, cannot always
be put on hold for technicalities. Parties, ignorant of the statute,
often chose not to document their contracts or modifications,
instead each relying upon the value of the other party's word.1 6
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted
or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606)
See Farnsworth, supra note 3, § 6.6 at 422-26, § 6.7 at 432-33.
10. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cole, 457 A.2d 656 (Conn.
1983).
11. Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987).
12. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
13. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1291; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4,
§ 1.9 at 29-30;
14. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.10 at 34.
15. T. QuINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 2-
209[A] [6], at 2-84 (1978); JOSEPH LEVIE, THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS IN
NEW YORK UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 10 N.Y.L.F. 350, 355 (1964);
J. WHITE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THe UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-5, at 44 (2d ed. 1980).
16. See Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales; Should
It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 829 (1950); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? -An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 712-14, note 45, at 722
(1931) (noting the frequency with which parties omit vital terms from a writing).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Requirements of the Code's Statute of Frauds
Contracts for the sale of goods priced above five hundred dol-
lars must satisfy the statute of frauds.17 The statute has three
formalities.'" First, a contract for the sale of goods must be evi-
denced by a writing.1 9 A memorandum of nothing more than
negotiations is not enough to bind a party. Some reasonable basis
for believing that a real transaction was entered into must under-
lie any discussion of satisfaction of the statute.2 ° Second, a writ-
ten and signed contract or note must be made at some point.2 '
Courts generally agree that the writing may be made any time
prior to the bringing of the action.22 The Code's sweeping defini-
tion of signature eases satisfaction of this requirement as a party
may sign a memorandum without intending to or realizing that he
or she is complying with the statute.23 Finally, the contract or
note must state a quantity. The Code provided that the note is
valid though a term is omitted or misstated, but not beyond the
quantity stated in the document. 24 Following the official commen-
tary to the Code's statute of frauds, courts throughout this country
have inferred from the language of section 2-201(1) that the quan-
tity term must be stated in the writing.2 5 Notably absent from the
Code's statute of frauds is any reference to the traditional require-
ment that the memorandum set forth all the essential terms of the
17. U.C.C. § 2-201(1). A revision proposed by a study group sponsored by the
Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. would increase the price threshold to $
10,000. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revision
of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2 - Sales 2-201(a) (Discussion Draft,
April 14, 1997).
18. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
19. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
20. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
21. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
22. Mid-South Packers v. Shoney's, 761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (invoice
made after contract formed was sufficient memorandum); Aragon v. Boyd, 450
P.2d 614 (N.M. 1969) (letters reciting contract sent after contract was formed
were sufficient memoranda).
23. U.C.C. § 1-201(39). The "intent" required by the Code is an intent to
authenticate the whole of the writing, rather than an intent to comply with the
statute. U.C.C. § 1-201, comment 39.
24. U.C.C. § 2-201(1). See also Eisler, supra note 7, at 428.
25. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1; Dangerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 189
(N.D. 1977); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Worldwide Licensing Corp., 898 P.2d 347,
350-51 (Wash. App. 1995).
1999]
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contract.26 The Official Comment goes so far as to state that the
language of section 2-201 was "intended to make it clear"27 that
the writing used to satisfy the statute "need not contain all the
material terms of the contract and such material terms . . .need
not be precisely stated."28 The drafters clearly abandoned strict
adherence to the original statute.
The Code provides alternative means of satisfying the statute
which were not previously available. Specially manufactured
goods 29 and part performance 30 exceptions allow a party to avoid
defeat in court for noncompliance with the statute. Admissions in
pleadings or testimony prevent the party so admitting from suc-
cessfully asserting the statute as a defense. 3 ' Likewise, the
merchants exception overcomes the statute where the recipient of
a note which would be good as against the sender has reason to
know of the note's contents and does not object within ten days.2
These alternative means of satisfaction and the meager require-
ments discussed above indicate that the Code does not dictate
strict adherence to the commercially blind statute as enacted in
1677. 33
B. Distinctions Between Section 2-209(2) and Section 2-209(3)
Relying on the Official Comment to section 2-209(2) which
allows the "parties in effect to make their own Statute of Frauds,"
courts often address sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(3) as though the
only difference between the two provisions is the origin of the writ-
ing requirement, by contract or by statute.3 4 This is perhaps the
greatest flaw in interpretation of section 2-209. While the distinc-
tion is noteworthy, it pales in comparison to the substantive differ-
ences between the so-called private and public statutes of fraud.
In blurring the substantive differences between these provisions,
courts have essentially trampled on the freedom to contract. The
inclusion of a no oral modification clause may be considered "boil-
erplate" language. 5 Boilerplate is by definition "standard" and
26. 4 Williston on Contracts § 567A, at 17 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
27. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
28. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1.
29. U.C.C. § 2-201(3Xa).
30. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
31. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
32. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
33. O'Connell, supra note 4, at 257.
34. U.C.C. § 2-209, comment 3.
35. Rothermel, supra note 6, at 1241.
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"almost universal" especially in the area of contracts.36 Thus, its
absence cannot be said to be a mere oversight. Rather, the
absence of an express provision within the contract proscribing
modifications except by a signed writing must be seen as part of
the bargained for exchange. In omitting such terms, contracting
parties are exercising their freedom to exclude contract terms
which are not statutorily required. If such an omission is prohib-
ited by the Code, then section 2-209(2) is meaningless because
there would be no reason for the parties ever to include a no oral
modification clause.
Section 2-209(2) has been labeled a "private statute of
frauds."3 v This is a misnomer. The statute of frauds may be satis-
fied or otherwise avoided by promissory estoppel,38 part perform-
ance,3 9 judicial admission, 0 or confirmatory memoranda. 4 '
However, a no oral modification clause is not subject to all of these
exceptions. Ongoing debate leaves doubt as to whether a confir-
matory memorandum satisfies section 2-209(2),42 though it is
expressly provided for in the Code's statute of frauds.43 A pro-
posed revision of the Code would expand the use of a confirmatory
memorandum to bind the recipient to include application in con-
tracts between non-merchants or between merchant and non-
merchant as well as between merchants.4 4 As the Permanent Edi-
torial Board of the U.C.C. considers this suggestion from a study
group it sponsored, the importance of this distinction becomes
even greater. Such revisions will make it easier to avoid the stat-
ute of frauds, further demonstrating the Code's excommunication
of traditional adherence to the statute of frauds. Noteworthy,
however, is the absence of any reference in these proposals to sec-
tion 2-209(2).42
Subsection two of section 2-209 differs from subsection three
in an even more significant manner. The former provision fulfills
36. Barron's Law Dictionary 54-55 (4th ed. 1996).
37. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.6, at 494.
38. Northwest Potato Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 678 P.2d 1138 (Mont. 1984).
39. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c).
40. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
41. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
42. For an interesting comment on this matter, see Rothermel, supra note 6.
43. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
44. Richard E. Spiedel and Linda J. Rusch, The Emerged and Emerging New
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2: Highlights of the Proposed Revisions, SC36
ALI-ABA 15 (1997).
45. Id.
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not only the evidentiary function of the so-called "public statute of
frauds", but also provides a principal greater protection from the
actions of his agent.46 Although the statute of frauds was not
intended to change the law of agency,47 no oral modification
clauses offer a principal greater protection than is normally
afforded under a standard statute of frauds provision.48 A typical
no oral modification clause states: "This agreement cannot be
modified in any way except in a writing signed by both parties."49
Such provisions serve a cautionary function. The contract can
only be modified by a writing. Actions of thoughtless or overzeal-
ous employees are less likely to bind their employers. 50 Employers
may hide behind the provisions of the no oral modification clause.
Debate continues over whether alternative means of satisfying the
statute of frauds satisfy the writing requirement of a no oral modi-
fication clause. 1 The existence of the debate evidences the distinc-
tion between a no oral modification clause and the statute of
frauds. Extending far beyond the mere evidentiary function of the
statute of frauds, "private statutes of frauds" are not statute of
frauds and thus should not be referred to as such.
Section 2-209(3) is by its own terms a true statute of frauds
within the terms of the Code. The Code states: "The requirements
of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must
be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions."5 2
The requirements of the Code's statute of frauds are neither
abbreviated nor expanded. Section 2-209(3) merely references the
reader to the Code's statute.53 Where the provision regarding no
oral modifications states that a contract which "excludes modifica-
tion or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise
modified or rescinded,"4 section 2-209(3) does not specifically
address modes of satisfying the statute of frauds. Section 2-209(3)
serves as a point of cross-reference to the Code's statute of
frauds.5 5 Expressly referring to section 2-201, section 2-209(3)
46. Eisler, supra note 7, at 419-20.
47. 4 Williston on Contracts § 587, at 177 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
48. Eisler, supra note 7, at 419-20.
49. 18 AM. JuR. 2D Legal Forms at 253:394.
50. Eisler, supra note 7, at 419-20.
51. Id.
52. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
53. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
54. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (emphasis added).
55. U.C.C. § 2-201.
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must be read in light of the language and case law of section 2-
201.56
The requirements of a sufficient writing differ depending on
whether the writing is compelled by subsection two or three. Sub-
section two presents a higher hurtle for the modifying parties to
jump. A no oral modification clause requires that the modification
be written, not merely memorialized by the writing. Where the
parties have included a no oral modification clause, the Code
requires modification "to be made 'by an instrument in writing.'' 5 7
Conversely, the statute of frauds is clear that a memorandum will
satisfy its requirements.
C. Faults in the Majority Application of Section 2-209(3)
The majority application of section 2-209(3) restrains common
commercial practices and inhibits beneficial modifications. 5 Most
courts have required that every modification of a contract within
the statute of frauds be memorialized by a writing though the
original contract did not contain a no oral modification clause. 59
Buyers and sellers who modify their agreement find themselves
trapped. A party seeking to modify or accommodate a modifica-
tion faces, on one hand, the tedious and time consuming process of
memorializing the modification, and on the other hand, the peril
of perhaps unreasonably relying on a parol modification.
Although the satisfaction process may be expedited through
the use of the merchants exception6 0 and electronic media,6 ' these
alternatives still slow the transaction and bring additional dan-
gers. Though a recipient may be bound by a note that would be
good as against the sender, assuming both parties are
merchants,6 2 the sender must dedicate time to constructing the
note and runs the risk of failing to send the written confirmation
56. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
57. Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm., 808 F.2d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
58. Quinn, supra note 15, at 2-84 (discussing the frequency of modifications
and the inclusion of no oral modification clauses).
59. Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir.
1978); Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Systems, Inc., 767 P.2d 740, 744 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991); Green Constr.
Co. v. First Indemnity of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D. N.J. 1990).
60. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
61. See Marc E. Szafran, A Neo-Institutional Paradigm for Contracts Formed
in Cyberspace: Judgment Day for the Statute of Frauds, 14 CARDozo ARTs & ENT.
L.J. 491, 502-506 (1996) (discussing electronic media as a "writing").
62. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
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within a reasonable time. Furthermore, determining what is a
reasonable time presents hazards which are beyond the scope of
this comment. The sending merchant must also gamble that in
the event of a dispute he will be able to establish that the recipient
had reason to know the contents of the note.63 As for the possible
use of electronic media such as e-mail and tape recordings, the
Code has not yet addressed the issue of whether such devices sat-
isfy the writing requirement of the statute. 4 Courts that have
broached the electronic memo and electronic signature issues
have not uniformly held that electronic signatures on electronic
memoranda satisfy the writing and signature requirements, espe-
cially in reference to audio tape recordings.6 5 Parties seeking to
use electronic media to memorialize a modification may find that
such efforts were of no avail if the courts or future Code revisions
conclude that these new media are insufficient.
The waiver alternative presented in section 2-209(4) and sec-
tion 2-209(5) offers its own hazards. Section 2-209(4) provides
that modifications which fail to satisfy sections 2-209(2) and (3)
"may operate as a waiver."66 The first obstacle a party attempting
to show a waiver must face is under what circumstances a flawed
modification operates as a waiver. Some courts have concluded
that reasonable reliance is necessary for a waiver;67 others have
vaguely stated that course of performance, possibly a higher bar
than reasonable reliance, is necessary. One court has gone so
far as to suggest that no more conduct than orally making the con-
tract is necessary to affect a modification.6 9 The second, and per-
haps greater, obstacle is determining what exactly is waived.
63. U.C.C. § 2-201(2), comment 3.
64. Szafran, supra note 61, at 502-506.
65. Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985) (tape
recording "at the meeting satisfies the statute"); But see Swink & Co. v. Carroll
McEntee & McGinley, 584 S.W.2d 393 (Ark. 1979) (assuming audio recording
was a memorandum, it was not signed).
66. U.C.C. § 2-209(4).
67. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1287 (an attempted modification is
effective as a waiver only if there is reasonable reliance that "adds something in
the way of credibility to the mere say-so of one party"); Varnell v. Henry M.
Milgrom, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 451, 455, 337 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1987) (oral agreement
without reliance is insufficient to establish a § 2-209(4) waiver).
68. Green Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp.1254
(D.N.J. 1990), affd without op, 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (waiver cannot be
established without a course of performance based on the waiver).
69. Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292, 296-97
(3d Cir. 1973).
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Neither the Code nor the Official Comment indicate what the
waiving party has waived. 70 Even if a party asserting the waiver
manages to demonstrate the necessary requirements for waiver
along with what the opposing party has waived, a greater chal-
lenge lies ahead. The waiving party may show that the waiver
was retracted. Section 2-209(5) allows a waiving party to retract
the waiver as to executory portions of the contract in the absence
of reasonable reliance. 71 Thus the party asserting the modifica-
tion ultimately faces the risk of unreasonable reliance on a waiver
which has been retracted. As with any issue of reasonableness,
much lies in the eyes of the beholder and the eagerness of the
court in finding for a particular party.
Despite the conundrums of subsection four, courts regularly
use waiver to avoid the harshness of the majority interpretation of
subsection three. All too often, the bases for these waivers are at
best strained and at worst absurd. Official comment on the
waiver provision indicates that the drafters did not want parties
to escape their "actual later conduct" by relying on the statute of
frauds or a no oral modification clause.72 Interpretation of actual
later conduct by the court in determining whether a waiver has
occurred leaves room for the court to find conduct amounting to a
waiver that may be less than convincing.
D. Proposed Application of Section 2-209(3)
Most courts that have addressed the modification issue have
required all modifications of contracts within the statute to be evi-
denced by a writing, without regard to whether section 2-209(2) or
section 2-209(3) controlled the case.73 As previously discussed,
these two provisions differ significantly. 74 Section 2-209(3)
requires that the modification satisfy the Code's statute of frauds.
The only term, according to section 2-201, which must be included
in the writing is the quantity term.7" If the original contract satis-
fied the statute, whether or not it was originally within the stat-
ute, by evidence of a written memorandum or other means
enumerated in section 2-201, then a modification of terms other
than the quantity term do not alter the original satisfaction of the
70. U.C.C. § 2-209(4); U.C.C. §2-209, comment 4.
.71. U.C.C. § 2-209(5).
72. U.C.C. § 2-209, comment 4.
73. See supra text accompanying note 59.
74. See supra text accompaning note 34-57.
75. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
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statute. That is to say, once a writing has been created giving a
reasonable basis for believing that an agreement exists, contain-
ing the signature of the party to be charged and providing a quan-
tity term, future modifications of other aspects of the contract will
not undermine the original satisfaction of the statute. One com-
mentator has referred to this proposition as "pass through" satis-
faction.76 The original satisfaction of the statute passes through
to the contract as modified except as pertains to modifications of
the quantity term.77
Why then do the courts require that all modifications be writ-
ten? No logical answer withstands critical analysis. A party seek-
ing to enforce a contract modified with regards to non-quantity
terms, such as price and date of delivery, almost uniformly must
'provide a signed memorandum.7" The plain language of section 2-
209(3) refers expressly to section 2-201.19 Section 2-201, making
no mention of terms other than quantity,8 ° has not been read to
require non-quantity terms to be memorialized except as pertains
to modifications. 8 ' Courts interpreting section 2-209(3) seldom
mention the requisites of section 2-201.82 It is submitted that
when read in light of section 2-201, section 2-209(3) requires that
only modifications of the quantity term must be evidenced by a
signed writing provided that the original agreement satisfied the
statute of frauds. Such an interpretation of section 2-209(3)
leaves intact the requirements of section 2-209(2) which by its
plain language allows modification only through a writing.8 3
Thus, those parties seeking to control the hasty actions of agents 4
may do so by simply inserting in the original agreement a no oral
modification clause.
Put in the simplest terms and the most convenient defini-
tions, the following rule emerges from this submission: When the
76. Eisler, supra note 7, at 427-30.
77. Id. at 427-30.
78. See supra text accompanying note 59; But see Costco, 898 P.2d at 351.
79. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
80. See U.C.C. § 2-201.
81. U.C.C. § 2-201; U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 1 ("The only term which must
appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is
limited to the amount stated. The price, time and place of payment or delivery,
the general quality of the goods, or any particular warranties may all be
omitted.").
82. See Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 P.2d. 1280; Dangerfield, 252 N.W.2d 184.
83. U.C.C. § 2-209(2). See supra text accompanying notes 34-57.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
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original agreement satisfies the statute of frauds, then modifica-
tions of that agreement require a memorandum only if the quan-
tity term is modified.8 5
The Washington State Court of Appeals appears to have fol-
lowed this reasoning in Costco Wholesale v. Worldwide Licens-
ing.8 6 In a contract for the sale of jewelry, Costco alleged that
Worldwide agreed to a rebate; Worldwide alleged that Costco
agreed to buy a greater quantity.87 Both parties contended that
the other party's claim was barred by the statute of frauds. s8
Commenting in a footnote that it disagreed with those courts and
commentators which require every modification to be in writing,89
the Costco court followed the plain language of section 2-209(3)
and looked to section 2-201 in determining the enforceability of
the alleged price and quantity modifications. 90
Noting that the original contract satisfied the statute and
that satisfaction passed through to the modified agreement, the
court in Costco barred Worldwide claim's on the quantity modifi-
cation, but refused to bar Costco's claim on the rebate. 91 The court
concluded that the defendant could not rely on the statute of
frauds to bar plaintiffs claim for the rebate since the rebate was
essentially a price modification.92 In satisfying the statute, parties
may omit the price term.9 3 Analyzing section 2-201, the court
properly reasoned that modifications of price need not be memori-
alized given that the statute of frauds does not require a memo-
randum of the price in the original contract.94 However, quantity
must be stated in the original contract or memorandum for the
contract to be enforceable. 95 Logically, modifications to such a
required term necessarily must be memorialized, and so the claim
on a parol modification of the quantity term failed.
An argument could be made that the inclusion of a non-quan-
tity term in the original memorandum somehow endows that term
with a greater fortitude than the statute provides. Since the par-
85. Eisler, supra note 7, at 430.
86. Costco, 898 P.2d 347.
87. Id. at 350.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 351.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 351.
93. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
94. Costco, 898 P.2d at 351.
95. U.C.C. § 2-201(1); Costco, 898 P.2d at 351.
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ties thought the term was of enough significance to include in the
original writing, subsequent modifications of such terms should be
unenforceable without a memorandum, or so the argument goes.
The inclusion of unnecessary terms does not alter the necessities
of satisfaction. If it is assumed that the unnecessarily included
term was of importance and it was because of this importance that
the parties included it, then the likelihood is that no modification
took place. The party asserting the modification most assuredly
will then fail to carry his burden of proof and no modification will
be found.96 Furthermore, the parties frequently have either made
the writing in total ignorance of the statute or included unneces-
sary terms in ignorance of section 2-201. 97 In the both types of
situations, an argument cannot be made with a straight face that
the parties included the unnecessary terms in the memorandum
lest those terms besubject to the parol modification. Those with
enough sophistication to be leery of the perversities of oral modifi-
cations would surely be sophisticated enough to include a no oral
modification clause rendering this debate moot.
E. Benefits of the Submitted Application of section 2-209(3)
At common law, consideration was a prerequisite to enforce-
ability of a modification.9" The Code extinguished this require-
ment99 and substituted in its place enforceability of no oral
modification clauses.100 Those wishing for the greatest protection
from false assertions of oral modifications will surely include a no
oral modification clause even at the expense of expediency. Com-
mon commercial practices and the speed with which they are exe-
cuted are a greater impetus on contracting parties to omit a no
oral modification clause from their agreement than is the margi-
nal benefit to be had from inclusion of such a term.
The modem business world presents buyers and sellers with
an extraordinary variety of conflicts. In the global economy, mar-
ket conditions change more rapidly than ever. News of shortages
and excess supply flash around the world via space satellites and
the internet. Such news directly and virtually instantaneously
varies the price at which goods are bought and sold. Distribution
and manufacturing expenses are likewise effected by such vari-
96. Taran Distrib., Inc. v. Ami, Inc., 237 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1956).
97. See supra text accompanying note 16.
98. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.6, at 492; Eisler, supra note 7, at 404.
99. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
100. U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
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ables. No longer can a retailer, distributor or manufacturer
remain stifled by formalities of a Code long since outdated. Many
conflicts and recessions have come and gone since the Code
originated in the 1950's. The law must keep pace with the needs
of common commercial practice. The flood of litigation surround-
ing section 2-209 evidences that common commercial practice can-
not lay idle, stalled by antediluvian formalities. Parol
modification is necessary and commonplace.
Those seeking to conform to common commercial practices
will not go unprotected from false assertions. Even in the absence
of a no oral modification clause, the Code does not throw open the
doors to false allegations. The requirement of good faith
remains. 1 1 The possibility of criminal sanctions looms over the
heads of would-be perjurers. One deterrent to the bringing of
false actions provides the greatest obstacle, the burden of proving
the alleged modification.
The burden of proving a modification rests with the party
asserting the modification. 1 2 Requiring a writing has not
changed this common law. Instead, such requirements have
encouraged the creation of documents to offer as proof of modifica-
tions and terms of such modifications. In the absence of a writing
requirement, however, a party asserting a modification can still
meet its burden through the production of testimony and other
evidence. It is acknowledged that the burden may be more difficult
to meet without a memorandum, but modern law provides a
framework within which these difficulties may be overcome. The
Code is part of this modern framework. As indicated in the Code's
section preceding § 2-209, the parties' course of performance is rel-
evant to determining the existence and terms of a modification. 0
Absent a no oral modification clause, testimony and other evi-
dence establishing a course of performance may be used by a party
asserting a modification of a non-quantity term to meet the bur-
den of proof. Thus, a party omitting a no oral modification clause
is afforded the protection of the original statute of frauds and the
shelter of the rules of evidence, while enjoying the liberty of orally
modifying a non-quantity term.
101. U.C.C. § 1-203.
102. Taran Distrib., Inc. v. Ami, Inc., 237 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1956).
103. U.C.C. § 2-208.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Code allows modification of a contract in the absence of
additional consideration and enforcement of a no oral modification
clause. Without such a clause, the Code requires only that the
contract, as modified, satisfy the statute of frauds. Where the
original contract satisfied the statute of frauds, that satisfaction
passes through to the modified agreement. Only agreements mod-
ifying the quantity term require a separate satisfaction. Keeping
apace with modern commercial practices, the submitted interpre-
tation of section 2-209(3) allows parties to a contract to modify as
market conditions and other factors vary.
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